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The way in which monetary policy is understood, both in practice and in the theoretical 
literature, has evolved in significant ways over the last few decades. Most significant, 
arguably, is an increasing awareness of the importance of the presentation of monetary 
policy. Central bankers have long been aware of the importance of the signalling effect of 
interest rate decisions on the one hand (Dow and Saville, 1988), and the care with which 
official pronouncements should be worded on the other. But it is only recently that there 
has been public discussion by central banks of the means by which monetary policy 
decisions are reached (e.g. Bank of England, 1999). At the same time, the theoretical 
literature has increased its focus on information, and information asymmetries between 
the monetary authorities and markets, as a critical element determining the outcome of 
monetary policy decisions. In particular there has been an increased focus on the 
transparency of monetary policy decision-making (see Geraats, 2002, for a review). But 
analysis of signals in relation to uncertainty qualifies the case for transparency. The 
purpose of this paper is to reflect on the signalling aspect of monetary policy in terms of 
an analysis of uncertainty. In particular, we consider how the central bank signals its own 
uncertainty. 
The concept of uncertainty itself is problematic, being subject to a range of different 
understandings. It is not our purpose here to make the case for any particular meaning(s), 
being concerned primarily with identifying what is being signalled. Where agents are 
uncertain, then the signals provided by the monetary authorities take on a critical role; 
any actual repo rate change is known with certainty, but its effects in general are not. We 
distinguish uncertainty in the economic system in a global sense, from model uncertainty 
on the one hand, and signal uncertainty on the other. Given that in the particular 
institutional framework of UK monetary policy-making a suite of models is consulted   2
rather than a single most trusted model, model uncertainty, in a sense to be further 
specified, is a matter of fact of actual policy decisions. Likewise, given that the signals 
emanating from the decision-making process of monetary policy are both quantitative 
and discursive, signal uncertainty finds expression both in quantitative and non-
quantitative ways. We are interested here in how model and signal uncertainty are 
related, and how to analyse non-quantitative signal uncertainty. 
We start by tracing thought about the role of information in relation to monetary 
policy, and then consider specifically the uncertainty attached to the information content 
of monetary policy signals. Different conceptions of model uncertainty are then explored. 
To the extent that monetary policy is not based on forecasts derived from a single 
stochastic model, the authorities are experiencing a form of model uncertainty that 
extends beyond the parametric uncertainty usually considered in the model uncertainty 
literature. In such a context, signalling assumes added importance since, in addition to 
offering a mechanism for transparency, it adds a further dimension of information with 
respect to analysis and decision-making under uncertainty. The possibility is discussed of 
incommensurate models, not only as an input to decision-making, but also as an input to 
the public’s understanding of monetary policy. Such incommensurability is resolved, by 
policy-maker and public alike, by the exercise of judgement, which we discuss in the 
fourth section. The foregoing analysis provides the basis for a discussion of how the 
central bank actually signals its uncertainty. In particular we discuss the scope for 
measurement of uncertainty by means of quantitative indicators and by means of 
discourse analysis. We then suggest an application of our approach to the monetary 
policy process of the Bank of England. 
   3
1. The role of information in monetary policy 
Monetary policy operates in conditions of uncertainty, both in terms of a potential 
asymmetry between the knowledge of the monetary authority and market participants, 
and the uncertainty with which that knowledge is held. There is further an 
interdependence between the monetary authorities’ knowledge, and uncertainty, and 
those of the market, since each enter into the expectations of the other. We will proceed 
on the assumption that it is sufficient to consider two types of economic agent: those who 
take the relevant decision on behalf of the monetary authority of an economy, and those 
who populate the markets of that economy, whom we will refer to as the ‘economic 
public’.  
Both types of agent will base their decisions on an understanding of the causal 
mechanisms at work in the economy, and the likely effects of monetary policy action. 
Formal economic models provide a mechanism for articulating these causal mechanisms, 
and are explicitly used by the monetary authorities and key market players. These 
models, and the data inputs, play a key role in conveying signals about the thinking of 
each type of agent. There is scope for asymmetry, in terms of differences in model 
employed, different data inputs, and different levels of awareness of each others’ models. 
Issues of information asymmetry and transparency have been central to much of the 
development of the theory of monetary policy over the past three decades. We discuss 
these developments to consider how they have been qualified in the course of the 
growing focus on issues of uncertainty. We argue that this has involved a changing sense 
of the role of formal models relative to more discursive understandings of causal 
mechanisms.   4
Rational Expectations Hypothesis (REH) 
The advent of rational expectations in economic modelling brought a new role for 
monetary policy. Based on the insight of Lucas (1972) that the general public cannot be 
systematically fooled by the policymakers, REH economists found that business cycles 
and movements in unemployment are compatible with dynamic stochastic general 
equilibrium models where agents’ decisions are the result of optimising behaviour. 
According to the REH, the Central Bank (CB) and economic agents act on the same 
model: economic agents form their expectations on the basis of the CB model. That 
model is public (whether made public, or due to the general public being able to impute 
the CB model according to the best available economic model provided by economists). 
The REH revolution brought two influential results: the policy ineffectiveness theorem 
(Sargent and Wallace, 1975) and the time-consistency policy (Kydland and Prescott, 
1977; Barro and Gordon, 1983). According to the first, active monetary policy is 
impossible if private sector expectations are rational and are formed using the same 
model as the authorities. Temporary deviations from long-term equilibrium can only be 
achieved if the authorities are able to shock the private sector with unanticipated policy 
actions, thus confusing expectations. Time consistency on the other hand requires that, to 
attain a low and stable inflation level, monetary policy should be chosen such that, if it is 
chosen as optimal at time t, it should remain so at time t+1. As a result academics and the 
central bank started to look for predictable economic rules which could be applied to the 
day-to-day operation of a monetary policy. 
New Keynesian Economics (NKE) 
The REH in effect removes uncertainty from the monetary policy process in that it 
assumes a close alignment between the monetary authority and the economic public, with   5
both forming their expectations according to a single transparent model. In the last twenty 
years modern macroeconomics has taken a different perspective on the monetary policy 
context. Instead of simply assuming close alignment, attention has now focussed on how 
such alignment could be brought about in practice through CB efforts. In other words, the 
focus has shifted to the provision of microeconomic foundations to macroeconomic 
questions. Deviations from long-run equilibrium are located in market imperfections, 
particularly price stickiness and information asymmetries. Reducing such imperfections 
will facilitate long-run equilibrium. Clear central bank signals about monetary policy are 
an important element in eliminating asymmetries. 
One of the main insights here has been the so-called New Keynesian Phillips curve, 
which results from the decisions taken by rational agents when bargaining their wages. 
Prices are shown to be sticky and to exhibit persistence over time, resulting in a forward-
looking dimension to inflation (Taylor, 1979; Calvo, 1983; Fuhrer and Moore, 1995; see 
also Clarida et al., 1999). Using a model à la Calvo, Ball (1994) shows for example how 
monetary policy could reduce inflation and produce a boom at the same time. Provided 
that price setters are forward looking, the announcement of a lower level of money 
supply by the CB will prompt firms to lower their expectations of the future money stock 
level. This leads to a lower price level today, and at the same time boosts today’s real 
money supply, and consequently output. In essence inflation can be costlessly reduced. 
The key here is the forward-looking nature of price setters, which in turn rests on a 
certain level of transparency between monetary authority and the economic public. 
New Macroeconomic Consensus 
Following Arestis and Sawyer (2004), a certain convergence on key issues can currently 
be identified in macroeconomics, which forms the basis of what may best be described as   6
a new monetary economics consensus. It is based on three propositions: nominal 
neutrality, inflation neutrality, and supply-side thinking. According to nominal neutrality, 
long-run equilibrium is not affected by the price level. According to inflation neutrality, 
real equilibrium is independent of the growth rate of nominal variables. The supply-side 
perspective, finally, implies that long-run unemployment is entirely determined by the 
supply side, so that there is no scope for a long-run trade-off between unemployment and 
inflation and between inflation and output. 
Dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models based on these principles, put together 
with the aim of investigating optimal monetary policy, suggest that monetary policy can 
be regarded more as a science than an art, with applied modelling being in a position to 
steer monetary policy (e.g. Zimmermann, 2003). These models are usually based on the 
assumption that central bankers, before implementing their policies, solve a dynamic 
optimisation problem under the restriction of given resources, institutions, and 
information, in order to maximise the utility of a given representative household. A 
feedback rule is then derived assuming that the CB has a target function which is defined 
as a quadratic loss function with respect to negative as well as positive deviations of 
inflation and output from the respective targets or reference values. 
  This framework suggests, contrary to REH for example, that inflation as such is 
harmful for economic growth and efficiency, so that achieving low and stable inflation is 
the main step towards a sound macroeconomic environment. Moreover, there is a clear 
and direct link between the interest rate as a CB instrument and the level of inflation. 
Probably the biggest conceptual result of this literature is the inflation-targeting 
framework: monetary policy should explicitly declare an optimal level of inflation and 
act such that this target is met at every point in time. The advantage of such an approach,   7
apart from the reduction in inflationary bias, would be its positive ramifications in terms 
of credibility problems. In particular, inflation targetting encourages increased 
transparency regarding inflation objectives via improved communication with the 
economic public (Mishkin, 2004).  
The question here is how far the information provided by the CB is rather part of a 
circular exercise in ensuring that CB expectations and those of the private sector 
converge on particular levels of the interest rate, which in turn are understood to conform 
to the achievement of the inflation target. It would then primarily be CB credibility in 
achieving the inflation target which would bring about wage and price settlements in the 
light of that target. But since changes in the repo rate do also have real effects, the 
possibility remains for expectations not to be self-fulfilling, and for credibility to be 
damaged. Further, the recent attention to model uncertainty suggests that central banks 
are not fully confident in any one model, and consequent interest rate rule implied, to 
determine the policy decision. Although many mathematically sophisticated micro-
founded DSGE models propose policy rules that CBs should apply under different 
macroeconomic scenarios, no monetary institution has so far decided to adopt them. The 
reason is that the models cannot fully replicate the global uncertainty which governs the 
daily economic environment. The issue then is whether, and if so how, CBs communicate 
this uncertainty and its role in monetary policy and its transmission. We explore the 
meaning and significance of model uncertainty in the next section. 
 
2. Model uncertainty: 'strong' versus 'weak' epistemic hypotheses 
One implicit presumption behind the theoretical developments considered in the previous 
section was that each agent has one preferred model, and there is confidence in that   8
preference. Let us refer to this presumption as the ‘strong epistemic hypothesis’. Model 
uncertainty captures the fact that central bankers are not necessarily confident enough to 
rely on a single model as the basis for policy decisions. In other words, they doubt the 
strong hypothesis. To date, most efforts to take account of model uncertainty have 
relaxed the strong hypothesis while maintaining that one best model does exist, by 
allowing for the fact that there may be problems in identifying the best model correctly. 
Let us refer to this relaxation as the ‘weak epistemic hypothesis’. 
Following Walsh (2004), let us consider a simple way of taking account of model 
uncertainty along the lines of the weak epistemic hypothesis by taking a look at the 
following macroeconomic model: 
 
1 / 2 1 1 + + + Κ + Ζ + Ζ = t t t t t t u i y y y )  (1) 
 
where  
1 + t y  is the state vector of macroeconomic variables; 
t t y /
)  is the current estimate (best guess) of  t t y / ; 
t i  is the policy instrument 
1 + t u  is a vectors of error terms (i.e. stochastic exogenous shocks) assumed equal 
to  1 + Τ t h  
2 , 1 Ζ  ,  1 + Κt , and Τ are matrices of the model parameters 
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Uncertainty arises because estimates of  2 , 1 Ζ ,  1 + Κt , and Τ by the policymakers are 
different from the true values. Define these estimates as  2 , 1 ˆ Ζ ,  1 ˆ
+ Κt , and Τ ˆ ; while  t t y / ˆ  
denotes the policymaker’s estimate of the current state  t t y / . 
 
With  2 1 Ζ + Ζ = Ζ  and  2 1 ˆ ˆ ˆ Ζ + Ζ = Ζ  we can rewrite the policy makers’ perceived model as 
 
() 1 1 / 1 ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ
+ + + + Τ + Κ + Ζ = t t t t t t w h i y y  
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There are three separate sources of model error in the above representation (Walsh 2004): 
 
•  Model-misspecification  
This is given by  ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] 1 / ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ
+ Τ − Τ + Κ − Κ + Ζ − Ζ t t t t h i y ; these are the errors which 
arise when the policymakers’ estimates differ from the their true value. Moreover 
this term captures the errors made in modeling the structural impacts of 
exogenous disturbances, ( )h Τ − Τ ˆ . 
 
•  Imperfect Information   10
() t t t y y / 1 − Ζ : errors arising from the estimate of the true state. Orphanides (2003) 
argues that these types of errors were the main cause of important policy errors in 
the 1970s. 
 
•  Asymmetric and/or inefficient forecasting 
() t t t t y y / / ˆ ˆ − Ζ ; this term reflects both inefficiencies in the policy-maker’s estimate 
of the current state vector ( ) 1 + t y  and informational asymmetries between the 
economic agents and the authorities. 
 
We should add that model uncertainty can take various other forms. In the context of the 
above specification, uncertainty may also arise from missing variables in the vector  1 + t y  
or from misspecification of an equation, or from misspecification in the functional form 
of the system. 
To check how robust a specific policy is to model uncertainty that accords to the weak 
epistemic hypothesis researchers usually follow three steps: (1) choose a reference model 
of the economy; (2) define a set of shocks/perturbations around this model, where the set 
is structured so that the uncertainty is focused on potentially-important weaknesses of the 
reference model; (3) choose policy so that it works best for the worst model from the set. 
Hansen and Sargent (2004) suggest using a robust control method. Robust control 
amounts to acknowledgment and incorporation of model uncertainty of the above kind in 
optimal control models, allowing selection of the best policy for the best outcome for the 
possible worst model. It is always assumed, though, that the economic model is the same 
for the policy-maker and for the market participants.   11
Recently, more radical departures from the traditional line of model uncertainty have 
begun to emerge. Eusepi (2005) for example proposes a model in which the central bank 
and the economic actors are uncertain about the model environment. He distinguishes 
between uncertainty about the evolution of output and inflation on the one hand, and 
uncertainty about the central bank monetary policy strategy on the other hand. The main 
conclusion is that CB transparency renders ‘the optimal policy rule robust to 
expectational mistakes, even in the plausible case where the economic agents face other 
sources of uncertainty about the economic environment. On the other end, lack of 
transparency can lead to a welfare-reducing outcome where self-fulfilling expectations 
destabilize the economic system’ (Eusepi, 2005, p. 22).  
The problem in trying to solve the model uncertainty issue lies in the inability of the 
researcher to work with the true economic model. In other words, the strong epistemic 
hypothesis assumes an omniscience on the part of economists which is, at best, an 
instrumental methodological assumption. This is born out by the fact that all the various 
scenarios generated in the literature are always model-specific; the competing reference 
models have marked differences in how expectations are formed, and on the persistence 
of output and inflation. 
Dow (2004) has drawn out the inevitable conclusion of these further relaxations of the 
strong epistemic hypothesis, by tackling head-on the thorny issue of model uncertainty in 
terms of the question as to which is the best model among a set of incommensurable 
candidate models, none of which provides a complete account of causal mechanisms. The 
issue here is the possibility that no one model can conceivably provide an adequate base 
for monetary policy. Without a reference model, model uncertainty cannot be expressed   12
formally in terms of that model. Further there is no formal focal point around which all 
actors’ expectations can converge. 
The monetary policy decision and the basis on which it is arrived at then involve 
elements beyond any one model. In the context of policy signals, this means that what is 
being signalled goes beyond formal properties of models or datasets. The simple fact that 
monetary policy decisions are communicated via several channels at once, some 
quantitative and some discursive, lends credence to such an alternative hypothesis. So 
does commentary that finds that interest rate decisions are made by a committee where 
‘each member holds to a particular view of the behaviour of the economy, represented by 
a macro model’ (Levin and Williams, 2003, p. 946).  
 
3. Signals, uncertainty and ambiguity 
In the previous section, we discussed a policy scenario that took account not just of the 
possibility that the economic public may be imperfectly informed about the model on 
which the monetary authority acts, but also of the possibility that decision-making within 
the monetary authority is subject to imperfect knowledge. The monetary authority may 
not have access to a single model of the economy which is regarded as encompassing all 
available knowledge, but instead is forced to rely on a suite of models that, if evaluated 
individually within a committee decision-making structure, may give rise to competing 
policy recommendations. We will now explore this scenario more systematically by 
distinguishing between three different kinds of uncertainty as they arise in a policy 
context. 
Consider the following, not too uncommon, context of monetary policy decision 
making with an independent CB, whereby at regular intervals, interest rate decisions (the   13
repo rate) are taken by an independent Policy Committee (PC) whose meeting minutes 
are subsequently made public in one form or another. The PC takes account of the current 
state of the economy and its likely development in the future, evaluates this state 
according to a set of models, and communicates the outcomes of its deliberations via 
several communication channels (minutes, press conferences and speeches, hearings with 
parliamentary committees, various CB reports, etc). We call the information on the 
current state of the economy the PC’s input data, the outcome of the set of procedures to 
which it has access to extrapolate from this data its empirical models, and the intellectual 
frameworks on the basis of which it evaluates the combination of input data and 
empirical models its theoretical models. 
The first form of uncertainty, which we take for granted here by simply referring to it 
as global uncertainty, refers to the subject matter of the monetary policy decision: the 
economy. In the medium and longer term, knowledge derived on the basis of 
extrapolation from past data is subject to considerable uncertainty, in the sense that any 
given prediction is typically confounded by subsequent events. The various ceteris 
paribus clauses of the models informing PC decision-making will rarely if at all be 
sufficiently satisfied for the models to act as a precise and unambiguous guide to policy 
decisions. In other words, the economy is subject to unpredictable shocks, including 
structural shocks.  
By contrast, on the level of models we encounter model uncertainty, in particular in the 
form of the multi-model interpretation of model uncertainty discussed above. The 
assumption here is that, even if the economy were to develop deterministically, our 
knowledge of it would be such that we are still unable to arrive at a single trusted model 
of it, be it an empirical or theoretical model. The reasoning is either that we would lack   14
access to crucial data, or that our conceptual understanding of economic phenomena 
would be bounded either in principle (due to limitations on human cognitive capacity, 
global uncertainty, etc.) or as a matter of fact. 
Signal uncertainty, finally, is associated with the outputs of the PC decision-making 
process, rather than its inputs or models. These outputs as we have seen can take various 
forms, henceforth called ‘channels’. The first channel on which we will focus consists of 
the interest rate decision itself. The announced value of the repo rate is of course 
transparently known with certainty by the economic public. But we are concerned here 
with the uncertainty surrounding the analysis behind the setting of the value, and about its 
likely consequences. This analysis is important for the formation of the public’s 
expectations about the future path of the repo rate. In particular, correctly anticipating 
changes in the repo rate is critical to the operations of financial institutions.  
But monetary policy may also be transmitted through other channels, in addition to the 
behaviour of financial institutions. The effect of a repo rate change itself is felt by the 
company and household sectors indirectly through the financial institutions from which 
they borrow, or with whom they invest. But the expectations generated by the signals 
accompanying the rate change can also have a direct effect on expenditure plans. A fall in 
the repo rate accompanied by signals that the PC is uncertain about the prospects for 
economic growth may have conflicting effects on company investment plans: the rate fall 
encourages investment, while the accompanying signal discourages it. The PC’s analysis 
is thus also important for the non-bank public’s interpretation of the significance of any 
repo rate change. If the MPC is uncertain about the effect of its monetary policy on 
expenditure and on inflation, and/or if the public are uncertain about the PC’s   15
expectations, then this will impact on the uncertainty with which the public interpret 
monetary policy. 
The Bank’s thinking about economic relations, including market uncertainty, and the 
PC’s own uncertainty, are signalled through several channels which operate alongside the 
primary channel of the interest rate decision itself. Traditionally, effects of changes in 
policy variables have been discussed in the literature in terms of the ‘transmission 
mechanism’ of monetary policy. We are here concerned with the discursive dimensions 
of any such mechanism, however its precise shape and details. The second  channel of PC 
decision making by which signal uncertainty is transmitted is a communication of the 
PC’s evaluation of economic uncertainty as it can be extracted from official CB 
publications. A third channel which may be considered, finally, consists of the explicit or 
implicit communication of subjective views and evaluations of PC members. 
If the output information arising from the PC decision-making process via these two 
additional channels, alongside the interest rate decision itself, is regarded as a signal to 
the economic public, then the presence of signal uncertainty will mean that the economic 
public are only imperfectly informed about this decision-making process. This may either 
be intended by the monetary authority as a strategic reflection of the PC’s own 
uncertainty, or instead it may be an inadvertent, possibly even inescapable, consequence 
of signalling processes of this kind. 
It is important to be clear about the source of signal uncertainty. We assume that signal 
uncertainty, like model uncertainty as discussed above, would prevail even if the 
economy would develop in a deterministic way, so that global uncertainty would not be 
an issue. Likewise, signal uncertainty does not depend on the presence of model 
uncertainty. This is due to the fact that the success of any act of communication relies not   16
just on the intentions of the sender but on how the signal is interpreted by the recipient, 
and that economic communication takes place in a strategic context. However, even if the 
monetary authority could commit itself in a way that would allow it to send credible 
signals, the very fact that these signals go beyond numerical expressions and include 
discursive material of the other two channels that we consider here makes them subject to 
the ambiguities any discursive attempt at communication is bound to exhibit (see further 
Winkler 2000, Klaes 2006). 
To recap, global uncertainty relates to the state of the economy, model uncertainty 
relates to the state of our knowledge of the economy, and signal uncertainty relates to our 
ability to communicate about economic matters. These concepts are nested: global 
uncertainty precludes the identification of a single model to capture economic relations 
(even stochastically) and thus requires the exercise of judgement. Global uncertainty 
therefore implies model and signal uncertainty. Even without global uncertainty, model 
uncertainty of the multi-model scenario kind means that judgement is required for policy 
decisions and, given the discursive nature of the expression of judgment, it also implies 
signal uncertainty. Signal uncertainty finally can stand alone, even without global or 
model uncertainty, if a policy decision involves explicit or implicit channels of 
communication via verbal expressions over and above monetary policy measures such as 
the repo rate announcement as such. 
 
4. Judgement and the signalling of uncertainty 
Uncertainty and the role of judgement 
Model uncertainty of the kind considered above has a noteworthy implication. In the 
absence of a single trusted model or of the possibility of expressing rationally a degree of   17
confidence in a suite of models and a mechanism for coordinating them, decision-making 
requires the exercise of judgement (Dow, 2004). This judgement is required with respect 
to the interpretation of information, and to the choice, and use made, of models, both 
empirical and theoretical. Judgement, by definition, is not the rational derivation of a 
single solution to a model. In the context of true model uncertainty, candidate models are 
incommensurate with each other; were they commensurate they could all be incorporated 
in one large model, potentially obviating the need for judgement. Even more open to 
judgement are model selection criteria, issues of interpretation of terms and of new data 
with respect to models, and the formulation of a coherent set of forecasts.  
  It is conventional at this point to discuss the relative merits of the basis for decision-
making as an art rather than a science. But our analysis of uncertainty does not allow 
such a bifurcation. Rather, evidence and modelling are used as far as they can be 
justified. But selecting the evidence and the models, combining the insights from each 
into an understanding of the forces at work in the economy and the likely effects of 
monetary policy actions, and formulating a policy decision require judgement, or art. 
Under conditions of uncertainty science requires art.   
Further, any monetary-policy decision-making process will need to consist of a set of 
institutionalised procedures that rely on expert input and follow a consensus mechanism 
that ensures that policy decisions, e.g. interest rate decisions, are arrived at. While such 
institutionalised procedures ultimately result in unambiguous repo rate decisions, they are 
nevertheless open to different interpretations by market participants, and may in fact be 
considered as a fourth communication channel, alongside the three considered above. 
In the conventional literature on the theory of monetary policy, the challenge for policy 
is to ensure adequate transparency of the form and content of decision procedures for   18
revealing the collective judgement of the PC. This would make it more likely that 
behaviour would be conditioned by the same expectations as the PC, helping to ensure 
that the PC’s predicted outcome does transpire. But also it would facilitate a closer 
anticipation of future decisions (thus avoiding policy shocks) if past PC thinking is well 
understood. Hence the central role of signals in monetary policy. The channels which 
send these signals, are thus of central significance. 
We have referred to signal uncertainty, meaning a lack of clarity in the signals 
implicitly or explicitly sent by the PC. But if that thinking is conditioned by uncertainty, 
then an analysis of signals needs to include an indication of uncertainty and how it is 
being handled as part of the content being signalled. The transparency literature itself is 
not unambiguously in favour of signalling uncertainty. There has been some analysis of 
the uncertainty effects of transparency (reviewed by Geraats, 2002, F534-6) which 
suggests that transparency with respect to monetary authority uncertainty may actually be 
welfare-reducing by increasing the variance of target variables: knowledge of the 
authority’s uncertainty increases the public’s forecast errors.  
But in any case, if judgement extends beyond knowledge or otherwise of white noise 
surrounding inputs to the policy model, then making sure that policy action is fully 
anticipated is more complex than being transparent about ‘the’ model and ‘the’ 
information set. Runde (1990) considers the implications of greater awareness of 
uncertainty of this kind. He shows how additional evidence, rather than reducing 
uncertainty, can actually increase awareness of the limitations of the preferred set of 
causal explanations, and thus reduce confidence in the explanations. How far increasing 
awareness of our ignorance is welfare-enhancing and how far welfare-reducing is a moot 
point (Dow, 1995). It may be possible to agree on the merits of reducing signal   19
uncertainty itself; but, if what is being signalled is a matter of judgement, where 
uncertainty is an inevitable element, then the issue remains as to whether that uncertainty 
should be signalled. Being transparent about uncertainty may reduce the effectiveness of 
monetary policy. 
Here we confine ourselves to the empirical question of considering more generally 
how, and how far, a PC signals its uncertainty. We are interested in considering how a PC 
may explicitly express its own uncertainty, and what can be gleaned from more implicit 
forms of expression which may be intended or unintended. In the next section we 
consider two approaches to signalling uncertainty: a quantitative approach of ‘uncertainty 
indicators’, and a non-quantitative approach of ‘discursive signals’ in the form of 
published minutes, reports etc.  
Conventional indicators of market uncertainty 
The empirical literature has a long tradition in attempting to measure macroeconomic 
uncertainty. There are two broad classes of technique available to quantify uncertainty: 
ex-post versus ex-ante approaches. The former traces uncertainty in the historical data of 
the process that generates the variable of concern. This group of methods includes: (i) 
traditional statistical variance or similar, such as a moving standard deviation; (ii) 
variance of the irregular component of a given stochastic process; (iii) the conditional 
variance estimated via a General Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedastic (GARCH) 
model where the mean equation is a first-order autoregression, allowing for ARMA 
errors. This is arguably the most popular methodology currently used to proxy 
uncertainty in whatever market or indicator the researcher is interested in. This approach 
is justified by Huizinga (1993, p.528) as follows: ‘The use of an ARCH model reflects a 
decision that the particular measure of uncertainty to be evaluated is the conditional   20
variance of a series. This measure seems to best account for the idea that for series whose 
deviations from the unconditional mean can be reliably predicted, it is not fluctuations 
around an average value that are of concern (that is the unconditional variance) but rather 
fluctuations about a predicted future path.’ (iv) Recently, unobserved components models 
have been used to extract a long and a short run uncertainty from historic time series (see 
Harvey, 1993; Kim, 1993). 
The ex-ante method makes use of survey data to derive some statistical measure of the 
variance. The main advantage of using survey data is that uncertainty measures are able 
to represent individual perceptions of risks based on the information available to 
individual agents. The drawback is that it requires a large amount of respondents to 
obtain meaningful data. Moreover, the assumption underlining this approach is that the 
subjective probability distributions of events reflect objective probability distributions. In 
practice, the majority of the studies apply ex-post methods in quantifying uncertainty. 
PC minutes and other discursive data 
Uncertainty indicators that are designed to reflect market uncertainty are only one of 
several kinds of contextualising data available alongside formal PC decisions such as the 
repo rate. There is scope for deriving some indicators of uncertainty from the various 
other channels through which the PC communicates, implicitly or explicitly: minutes of 
PC meetings, to the extent that they are made public, any additional CB reports, etc. 
Additional indicators may thus be obtained, furnishing a potential proxy for the 
uncertainty as faced by the PC in their considerations. On the most basic level for 
example, a simple count of uses of the terms ‘uncertain’ and ‘uncertainty’ may be taken 
as an ordinal indicator of how much uncertainty the PC was experiencing. Further 
analysis may involve relating the incidence of the ‘uncertainty’ terms with economic   21
fundamentals, and also with indicators of uncertainty in financial markets and in the 
corporate sector. Thus, if a prior theory is formulated about how decision-making 
responds to particular developments (such as a financial crisis), how PC deliberations 
draw on a range of inputs, how uncertainty is understood by the PC, and how it affects 
policy decisions, then quantitative indicators can be used for an empirical test of such a 
theory. 
 
5. The Bank of England and monetary policy signals 
Having outlined our general approach, we will now take a first step of applying the 
framework to the analysis of a particular case. Our general framework of analysis 
proceeds from a policy scenario that takes account not just of the possibility that the 
economic public may be imperfectly informed about the model on which the monetary 
authority acts, but also of the possibility that decision-making within the monetary 
authority is subject to imperfect knowledge. The monetary authority may not have access 
to a single model of the economy which is regarded as encompassing all available 
knowledge, but instead is forced to rely on a suite of models that, if evaluated 
individually within a committee decision-making structure, may give rise to competing 
policy recommendations. This is the scenario expressed in the Bank of England’s (1999) 
discussion of its modelling approach, which in our interpretation explicitly acknowledges 
the challenges posed by model uncertainty. 
We will in the following restrict our attention to interest rate decisions as they are taken 
by the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) of the Bank of England. The MPC meets 
monthly to consider changes in the interest rate under its control (the repo rate). In doing 
so, it takes account of the current state of the economy and its likely development in the   22
future, evaluates this state according to a set of models, and communicates the outcomes 
of its deliberations via several communication channels (minutes of MPC meetings, press 
conferences and speeches, hearings with parliamentary committees, and the quarterly 
Inflation Report; see further Bell, 2005).
1 The MPC has no expectation of their central 
projection being precisely met (Bell, 2005, p.7). In other words, the MPC accepts an 
overall context of global uncertainty as defined above.  
The first channel for communicating the MPC’s monetary policy is of course the 
interest rate decision itself. Its output is a numerical value (so far) on a ‘quarter-percent 
scale’ that indicates by which amount, if any, the rate is adjusted up or down. The second 
channel of MPC decision making is a communication of the MPC’s evaluation of 
economic uncertainty as it can be extracted from the notation of the fan charts of the 
Inflation Reports. The third channel we will consider, finally, consists of the published 
minutes of the MPC meetings, which, since discursive in nature, must be regarded as a 
source of potentially significant signal uncertainty. If the output information arising from 
the MPC decision-making process is regarded as a signal to the economic public, then the 
presence of signal uncertainty will mean that the economic public are only imperfectly 
informed about this decision-making process. If the Bank of England is concerned with 
increasing transparency, it should therefore be concerned with signal uncertainty of this 
kind. 
We argued above that once the strong epistemic hypothesis relating to models 
informing monetary policy is relaxed to the point where model uncertainty is explicit 
acknowledged, monetary policy will have to rely on the exercise of judgement, even 
though it may be informed by a suite of trusted models. The models employed by the 
                                                 
1 In principle the MPC’s thinking is communicated in a letter to the Chancellor of the Exchequer if the 
actual inflation rate deviates unduly form the target, but this has not so far been required.   23
Bank of England in its suite-of-models approach are themselves incommensurate; were 
they commensurate they could all be incorporated in one large model, potentially 
obviating the need for judgement. Were judgement not such a central aspect of the 
MPC’s deliberations, there would be little scope for the kind of disagreement which 
arises between members in the exercise of judgement.  
The MPC are quite explicit that their decision-making involves the exercise of 
judgement with respect to knowledge which is held with uncertainty (Bank of England 
1999; Lomax, 2005). This openness about uncertainty is a relatively recent feature of 
central bank pronouncements, following the disappointment in the 1980s with relying on 
single large models for monetary policy-making. We are interested in considering how 
the MPC explicitly expresses its own uncertainty, and what can be gleaned from more 
implicit forms of expression. 
We consider two approaches to signalling uncertainty: the quantitative approach of 
‘uncertainty indicators’, and the non-quantitative approach of ‘discursive signals’ in the 
f o r m  o f  p u b l i s h e d  m i n u t e s ,  r e p o r t s  e t c .  W h a t  w e  w i s h  t o  s t r e s s  h e r e  t h o u g h  i s  t h e  
complementary nature of discursive and quantitative channels, rather than discursive 
sources merely adding a secondary gloss on quantitative indicators. For example, while 
the fan charts express the uncertainty surrounding the two-year point forecast, the 
minutes express the uncertainty surrounding specific aspects of the analysis which led up 
to that forecast, and thus provide additional signals to the public. While summary 
statistics can thus tell us something further than the fan charts, a detailed study of the 
texts of minutes, as is done by market watchers and market participants, is an additional 
channel of communication.   24
We now turn to a more detailed consideration of the main signalling channels of MPC 
decision making. 
The Bank of England Fan Charts 
Since 1996, even before the current institutional arrangements for monetary-policy 
decision-making were established, the Bank of England has published its inflation and 
GDP projections in the form of fan charts. Rather than focusing on one central forecast, 
the fan shows a range of bands around the central forecast, in order to express its own 
model uncertainty. There are ten bands, and there is a 10% probability of the actual 
inflation rate falling within each band (at the end of the two-year forecast horizon – the 
intervening period’s bands are simply interpolated).   
As an expression of uncertainty, the fan chart is clearly quantified (indeed the Bank 
publish the precise data on which it is based). But how are we to understand what is being 
measured? The Bank’s explanatory notes shed some light on this, explaining that ‘the fan 
chart portrays a probability distribution that approximates to the MPC’s subjective 
assessment of inflationary pressures evolving through time, based on a central view and 
the risks surrounding it’ (Britton, Fisher and Whitley, 1998, p. 31, emphasis added). 
Further, ‘the uncertainty in the subjective assessment of inflation relates to how likely it 
is that the future events will differ from the central view. It is therefore a forward-looking 
view of the risks to the forecast, not a mechanical extrapolation of past uncertainty.’ 
(ibid. p. 32).  
The language quoted above is that of the Subjective Expected Utility (SEU) approach 
whereby, even if there is no concrete objective basis for probability estimates, these can 
be assigned subjectively. Here the requirement is stronger, that the MPC arrive at a 
collective subjective assignation of ex ante probabilities to the risks attached to the   25
central forecast. But there is no formal basis for doing this, given the derivation of the 
central forecast from a suite of models to which judgment is applied following lengthy 
deliberations. Rather, the fan charts apply a forward-looking modeling approach to 
calculating the risks attached to the central forecast on the basis of past errors; it is only 
the degree of skewness which is the outcome of subjective judgment (Nikolov, 2002).
2 
An interesting characteristic of the Bank of England forecasts is that they are computed 
assuming both an unchanged repo rate and an interest rate based on market’s interest rate 
expectations. This second case introduces the hypothesis that there may be a reverse 
channel, where the Central Bank acquires information from the market rather than vice 
versa. But since the market agents form their expectations on the signals given by 
policymakers, we are therefore faced with the potential of a circular policy environment 
with no economic leader.
3 
MPC minutes and other discursive data 
But the fan charts are only one channel for communicating the MPC’s thinking on 
uncertainty. There is scope for deriving some indicators of uncertainty from the other 
channels: the MPC Minutes, the Inflation Report, etc. The resulting indicators furnish a 
proxy for the uncertainty as faced by the MPC in their considerations. On the most basic 
level for example, a simple count of uses of the terms ‘uncertain’ and ‘uncertainty’ can be 
taken as an ordinal indicator of how much uncertainty the MPC was experiencing.  
Such an approach can be taken further in order to glean more information about the 
MPC’s thinking in relation to uncertainty. Comparing the relative uses of the terms 
‘uncertain’ and ‘uncertainty’ on the one hand with ‘risk’ and ‘risky’ on the other provides 
                                                 
2 It is still difficult to understand exactly how this collective subjective judgement is in practice quantified 
in order to be applied to the detailed fan chart’s detailed numerical parameters.   
3 Bernanke and Woodford (1997) show that it is not optimal for a Central Bank to target private forecasts 
since it leads to indeterminacy of the rational expectations equilibria.    26
information on the relative importance of the two, as well as how far they are correlated, 
thereby opening up the possibility of an assessment of uncertainty along more than one 
conceptual dimension. Comparing the relative incidence of both sets of terms in the MPC 
minutes and in the Inflation Report provides some indication on such matters as how far 
the two documents are consistent (the latter bearing the imprint more of Bank staff), 
and/or how much additional uncertainty is expressed in the context of the policy decision. 
Further analysis involves relating the incidence of the ‘uncertainty’ terms with economic 
fundamentals, and also with indicators of uncertainty in financial markets and in the 
corporate sector. Thus, if a prior theory is formulated about how decision-making 
responds to particular developments (such as a financial crisis), how the MPC 
deliberations draw on inputs such as the Inflation Report, how uncertainty is understood 
by the MPC, and how it affects policy decisions, then quantitative indicators can be used 
for an empirical test of such a theory. 
We are therefore suggesting going further than quantitative indicators, drawing on the 
discourse approach to studying texts which is already well-established in economics (see 
further Klaes and Sent, 2005). This requires a careful, contextual, analysis of the use of 
terms phrase by phrase in order to glean the intended meaning. This in turn requires that 
the analysis be embedded in a prior theory as to channels of information, and the 
decision-making process, incorporating feedback between information and decision-
making among all the relevant parties. This is particularly apposite for an analysis of 
uncertainty, where reflexivities abound. The uncertainty faced by the Bank of England 
arises partly as a result of uncertainty faced by the general public, which in turn is 
influenced by the Bank’s uncertainty.    27
In arguing for an discursive approach to analysing MPC decision making, we are not 
alone. Cobham (2003) provides an example of the form an explorative approach of this 
kind may take. In an analysis of the factors responsible for interest rate smoothing, he 
finds in an analysis of the UK monetary policy context that focuses on the decisions and 
minutes of the MPC that only limited influence, if at all, can be attributed to perceived 
uncertainty by the MPC. This perceived uncertainty is identified by considering the 
importance given in the MPC minutes to economics fundamentals (demand, output, etc.) 
relative to other factors, which, in Cobham’s terminology, include ‘uncertainty’. Out of 
the minutes of 62 MPC meetings considered, uncertainty was regarded as a decisive 
factor at 23 meetings. The forms of uncertainty considered were data uncertainty, 
parameter uncertainty, and ‘wider uncertainty’ associated for example with trends in the 
world economy. The outcome of 17 of those 23 meetings (74%) was no change in rates, 
comparing to a ‘no decision rate’ in all meetings of only 63%. 
Rosa and Verga (2005a, 2005b) adopt a more sophisticated methodological framework, 
albeit in a study of European Central Bank (ECB) monetary policy. Based on the monthly 
ECB press conferences, they construct a discourse-based uncertainty index. They find 
that this index provides a complementary explanatory factor, alongside more 
conventional market-based measures of monetary policy expectations, when it comes to 
ECB interest rate policy. We argue for an extension of discourse analytic approaches of 
this kind. Quantitative indicators based on texts are subject to obvious limitations which 
need to be considered in any such approach. What is required is a more thorough 
discursive approach, starting out from close systematic study of CB communications such 
as minutes, press conferences and other sources.   28
6. Conclusion 
Central bank documents are worded extremely carefully; there is a good understanding of 
the signalling value of texts and of the seriousness with which they are therefore poured 
over by the public. They therefore provide excellent case material for discourse analysis. 
We have seen the conventional theoretical rationale for the authorities to adopt the 
stance that transparency is desirable, on the grounds that their projections are more likely 
to be met if they are understood and shared by the public. Monetary policy then no longer 
shocks the economy into a change of course. Rather policy documents, and the 
announced reasoning behind policy decisions, nudges the economy in the direction the 
monetary authority wants it to take; ideally the decisions themselves are fully anticipated 
(Friedman, 2004). 
But full certainty is impossible given the possibility of developments unanticipated by 
the authorities, as well as uncertainty surrounding the interpretation not only of data but 
more seriously about causal mechanisms, and thus about forecasts. The uncertainty 
experienced by the authorities is then an input to the uncertainty of the public, and vice 
versa, and full transparency is open to question. This uncertainty is signalled through a 
range of channels. While there is some scope for quantitative analysis of texts as a way of 
identifying the MPC’s signalling of its own uncertainty, along the lines described above, 
ultimately a more deeply probing semantic analysis may be required fully to grasp the 
wider dimensions of the signal. 
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